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THE OCEAN SHIPPING ACT OF 1978:
NEW DIRECTION IN
MARITIME LEGISLATION
The Ocean Shipping Act of 1978' was the Congressional reponse to the
growing usurpation of maritime trade from U.S. shippers by the Soviet
Union's merchant fleet.' Specifically, Congress desired to give the Federal
Maritime Commission (hereinafter referred to as FMC) new power to
regulate and check the rate-cutting practices of state-controlled carriers
3
operating as "cross-traders"' in U.S. ocean commerce. Although the legisla-
tion is not overtly directed at any one nation, the reports accompanying it are
singularly concerned with the Soviet merchant fleet and its rapid ascension
in world maritime commerce.' Since the enactment of the Ocean Shipping Act
of 1978 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) almost one year ago, the issue has
grown in importance to those concerned with the transportation aspect of
import-export trade. New legislation is being devised to augment the existing
statutory laws.' This topic is certain to be in the forefront of issues in
international trade.
1. The Ocean Shipping Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-483, 92 Stat. 1607, codified as 46
U.S.C. § 817(c) (1978). As enacted, the Act amends the Shipping Act of 1916 by adding
subsection (c) to § 817 and amending the definition of a controlled carrier found in 46
U.S.C. § 801(2) (1970). The legislative history of the bill is set forth in 119781 U.S. CODE
CONG. AND ADM. NEWS. 3536.
2. See generally Expansion of the Soviet Merchant Marine Into U.S. Maritime
Trades, Study of the Maritime Administration (August, 1977). Soviet penetration of
American shipping amounted to .3 percent in 1971. By 1977, the share had increased to
3.4 percent, a tenfold increase. The Maritime Administration (MarAd) of the Depart-
ment of Commerce estimates that by 1986 Soviet flag ships will account for six percent
of U.S. liner cargo trade. See also S. REP. No. 1260, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1978).
3. See H.R. REP. No. 1381, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1978). [hereinafter cited as
H.R. REP. No. 13811. Earlier attempts at regulating rates were unsuccessful for lack of
compliance. For example, an agreement between the Chairman of the FMC and the
Soviet Minister of the Merchant Marine, Timofey Guzhenko, known as the Leningrad
Agreement (July 16, 1976) failed primarily because of the Soviet refusal to follow the
letter and spirit of the agreement. The Soviets had agreed to charge rates not lower
than those offered by other independent carriers and to begin negotiations toward join-
ing the shipping conferences of the world maritime community.
4. See S. REP. No. 1260, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1978) 1hereinafter cited as S. REP.
No. 12601. "Cross-traders" are defined as carriers which operate in a specific trade and
do not fly the flag of the importing or exporting nations in that trade. Such carriers are
also commonly known as Third-Flag carriers.
5. See H.R. REP. No. 1381 at 3 and S. REP. No. 1260 at 12.
6. In progress is the Ocean Shipping Act of 1980, a 64 page bill which is a con-
solidation of three separate Senate bills (S. 1460, S.1462 and S.1463) introduced by
Senator Daniel K. Inouye, Chairman of the Commerce Subcommittee on Merchant
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The scope of this note will be an examination of the Act, its development
and its effectiveness in countering the problem of rate-cutting by the Soviet
Union? The effectiveness of the Act is integrally connected to the efforts of
the United States to even its balance of trade deficit through a vigorous
export program. The irony of that effort lies in the fact that even as export
trade grows, the goods are increasingly carried to their destinations by
controlled carriers operating as cross-traders, at the forefront of which is the
Soviet Union."
THE SOVIET MERCHANT FLEET
Essential to an understanding of the Act is a brief examination of the
entity it was designed to affect. In an historical context, the Soviet Union has
been described as a continental power with only an ancillary link to the high
seas and maritime power. Despite this characterization, the Soviets have, in
the last twenty-five years, built one of the world's newest, largest and most
successful merchant fleets.' It has been suggested that the impetus for this
Marine and Tourism. If passed as is, the legislation will significantly modify the Ship-
ping Act of 1916, a move endorsed in the conclusion of this Note. Specifically, the FMC
will be tasked with quicker processing of complaints and a greater degree of independ-
ence from the Administration. For the shippers, two-tier rate discounts will be set up
ranging from 13-18 percent. Notably, the bill abandons any attempt to obtain a fixed
percentage of trade cargo for U.S. flag ships but, instead, relies on a "substantial use"
standard.
7. See generally Simon, More on the Law of Shipping Containers, 6 J. MAR. L. &
CoM. 603 (1975). Although rate-cutting is especially pernicious to the highly unionized
U.S. Merchant Marine, other problems do present serious challenges to world shipping.
The problem of shipping over-capacity has emerged from the development and intro-
duction of containerized cargo vessels with their increased carrying capacity over tradi-
tional break-bulk ships. More recently, the use of Roll on/Roll off (Ro-Ro) and Lighter
Aboard Ship (LASH) vessels has introduced a new variable in the economic analysis of
shipping cost efficiency. The other major concern in the shipping communities is the
proposed UNCTAD Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences. U.N. Doc. TD/CODE/11/
Rev.1 (1974), reprinted in INT'L LEGAL MATS. 912-51 (1974). The focus of this legisla-
tion is the protection and nurturing of Third world shipping interests. See also Capone,
United States Laws and the Convention on a Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences: A
Catalogue of Conflicts and Dilemmas, 15 VA. J. INT'L L. 249 (1975). A liner conference
is a group of carriers serving an ocean trade route that have agreed to operate on the
basis of a common tariff applicable to cargo rates and general terms and conditions of
service.
8. Id. See also S. REP. No. 1260.
9. See H.R. REP. No. 1381 at 12-13. It has been estimated that 54 percent of the
Soviet liner tonnage is engaged in international cross-trading, the majority of which is
with the United States. As of 1978, only five percent of the cargo carried by Soviet liner
vessels was between the United States and the U.S.S.R.
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growth is a strategic triad of political, military and economic factors rather
than any commercial ventureousness." While the Soviet fleet has grown,
there has been a concomitant decrease in the number, though not necessarily
the capacity, of the U.S. merchant fleet." Whatever edge the United States
has in capacity must be cushioned by the realization that it is due primarily
to the capacity of our large tankers. 2 In fact, a disproportionate amount of
U.S. tonnage is found in large volume tankers rather than bulk carriers. 3
Moreover, the modernity of the two fleets is reflected in the average age of
the vessels, and area in which the Soviet fleet is roughly half the age of its
American counterpart.' If there is any area in which the U.S. fleet has an
edge on the Soviets, it is in fleet composition. Orrly recently has the Soviet
Union begun to construct and employ containerships and LASH (Lighter
Aboard Ship) carriers in significant numbers." Since the Soviet Union is not
10. See Ackley, The Soviet Merchant Fleet, U.S. Naval Inst. Proc. (February 1976).
Professor Ackley suggests four roles carried out by the Soviet merchant fleet:
1. reduce Soviet dependence on Western shipping,
2. ensure the capability of transporting arms and supplies to client nations,
3. augment military sealift capability, and
4. provide an image/influence-building instrument of foreign policy.
A fifth role may lie in the potential for the Soviet merchant fleet to undermine the U.S.
merchant fleet through competitive elimination. See also The Attempt to Control Pre-
datory Soviet Shipping Practices, 13 GoNz. L. REV. 1023 (1978).
11. See U.S. Department of Commerce, Maritime Administration, U.S. Merchant
Marine Data sheet (February 5, 1980). The statistical decline of the privately-owned
deep-draft fleet is reflected in this data sheet. For instance, on Nov. 1, 1979, the U.S.
merchant fleet totaled 736 vessels comprising 22.9 million deadweight tons (dwt.). On
January 1, 1980, there were 727 vessels totaling 23.5 million dwt. Thus, a numerical
decline of nine ships was accompanied by an aggregate increase of 600,000 dwt. in fleet
capacity.
12. As of February 1980, the dry-bulk component of the U.S. merchant fleet
totaled 19 ships, all but three of which are thirty or more years old. In other areas,
however, the United States has a near monopoly, for example, Liquified Natural Gas
(LNG) carriers. See also Address by Samuel B. Nemirow, Assistant Secretary of Com-
merce for Maritime Affairs, before the Propeller Club of San Diego (Mar Ad Press
Release) (Feb. 26, 1980).
13. Id. The most recent available statistics indicate that tankers in the active fleet
total 14.8 million dwt. while bulk carriers account for 508,000 dwt. See supra note 11.
14. See I. HEINE, THE UNITED STATES MERCHANT MARINE: A NATIONAL ASSET (1976).
The average age of ships in the U.S. merchant fleet is twenty years old while that of
the Soviet ships is ten.
15. See Ackley, supra note 10. Contemporary maritime analysts often emphasize
quantitative comparisons to the neglect of qualitative considerations. It should be
noted, however, that the Soviets are rapidly building containerships and Ro/Ro vessels
to augment their fleet capability. For example, in recent years, the "P" Class vessels
(small break bulk/containerships) with a capacity of 360 twenty foot equivalent units
(TEU) have been replaced by "K" Class containerships such as the Khudozhnik Saryan
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a net importer of crude oil at this time, it has not emphasized tanker
construction as the United States has. There is evidence, however, that the
Soviets are interested in this sector of trade. The construction several years
ago of the 150,000-ton supertanker Krym has signaled the seriousness of
their interest.
The origins of the Soviet merchant fleet can be arbitrarily dated from
1957, the year in which it began to be developed in earnest. A gradual
increase in Soviet foreign trade and aid necessitated the construction of a
merchant fleet to transport materials. For example, in 1961, the U.S.S.R. was
required to charter foreign ships to carry 19.3 million tons of cargo, roughly
thirty-one percent of its foreign trade that year.'6 The reliance on foreign
charters generated a negative flow of precious hard currency, a situation that
prompted the Soviets to begin work on a fleet capable of reducing and
ultimately eliminating this unacceptable reliance." The Soviets have gra-
dually built a merchant fleet that emphasizes large intermodal vessels over
tankers and other specialized ships.'8 A net drain of hard currency has been
replaced by an influx of hard currency even though the fleet's subsidization
by the Soviets often represents a loss in domestic economic terms. In so doing,
the Soviets have fulfilled the primary goal of the Seven-Year Plan unveiled
in 1957, which was to effect a merger of national security and economic
priorities directed at undermining the influence of the Western world on
Third World nations.'9 It was this success that brought world attention to the
potential threat posed by the new Soviet fleet. The attention of the United
States has been directed towards the growth of Soviet international shipping
lines."0 Of particular concern has been the formation of twenty lines operating
exclusively as cross-traders."
(798 TEU) and Ro-Ro ships such as the Magnitogorsk with a 1,368 TEU capacity.
Moreover, the Soviet Five Year Plan for 1976-80 calls for a threefold increase in con-
tainerships and Ro-Ro vessels. The latter are highly prized by military logistical plan-
ners because of their versatility.
16. Id.
17. See N. Shadrin, The Soviet Merchant Marine, A Late Developing Economic
Growth Sector, in Soviet Economic Prospects for the Seventies, United States Congress,
Joint Economic Committee, 93rd Cong., Washington, D.C. June 27, 1973.
18. See generally Heine, supra note 14.
19. See Sulikonyski, Translator's Introduction to Soviet Ocean Policy, 3 OCEAN
DEV. & INT'L L. 69 (1976). Despite the emphasis on political/idealogical goals, the
pragmatic Soviet leadership is acutely aware of economic factors such as balance of
trade deficits and extended credit debts.
20. See COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, REPORT ON SOVIET OCEAN ACTIVITIES: A PRE-
LIMINARY SURVEY, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
21. Id. See also supra note 4.
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The threat contained in the Soviet organization of shipping lines is that
they operate outside the established shipping conferences. As a result, the
Soviet lines can set lower rates to attract customers while at the same time
remaining free of noncompetitive agreements.n The actions of the Soviet
merchant fleet have generated uneasiness among conference carriers that
some of their co-members will be tempted to offer illegal rebates and thus,
precipitate destructive competition.2 3 With this prospect in mind, the U.S.
Congress was prompted to begin hearings on the need for and content of
regulation of the rate-setting practices of the U.S.S.R.
The United States, as the largest trading nation in the world, has always
had an interest in maintaining its trade transportation network. The U.S.
Merchant Marine, as one component of that network, has always competed
with the shipping lines of other countries for cargo. Through a series of
agreements, an equilibrium is maintained that prevents ruinous competi-
tion.24 When state-owned and controlled carriers of countries such as the
U.S.S.R. are able to focus the national resources on the penetration of
lucrative trade markets, the competitive equilibrium is jeopardized. In the
case of the U.S. market, Soviet penetration was deemed to be based on
noncommercial motives.' Early on, it was recognized that the provisions of
the Shipping Act of 1916 were inadequate to resolve the problem of
22. See generally Bennathan & Walters, Shipping Conferences: An Economic
Analysis, 4 J. MARITIME L. & COM 93 (1972) and Zamora, Rate Regulation in Ocean
Transport, Developing Countries Confront the Liner Conference System, 59 CALIF. L.
REV. 1299 (1971). The latter article provides some perspective on the impetus for the
UNCTAD liner legislation.
23. See Illegal Rebating in the U.S. Ocean Commerce: Hearings Before the Subcom.
on Merchant Marine and Tourism of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and
Transportation, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). In response to the problems posed by these
agreements, the Shipping Act Amendments of 1979 (H.R. 3055) were enacted. In effect,
the legislation amended the Shipping Act of 1016 to provide the FMC with a
framework for enforcement of the law. The legislative history is set forth in [1979] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1392.
24. See H.R. REP. No. 1381 at 3. As stated in the report, state controlled carriers
"have actively and systematically pursued a practice of rate-cutting to attract more
cargo for their ships. This threatens to disrupt our international trade and jeopardize
the viability of the United States and other privately owned carriers serving this
trade." Id.
25. Id.
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rate-cutting. Thus, a two-fold task evolved: amend the Shipping Act of 1916"
and put the teeth back in the tiger's mouth, that is, the FMC. 7
THE DEVELOPMENT OF H.R. 9998
As a result of new Congressional concern with Soviet practices,
Rebresentative Murphy introduced H.R. 9998 in 1977. A series of hearings
began on the bill during which input was received from the relevant federal
agencies, domestic shipping groups and international shipping interests.'
Significantly, from the outset, the bill enjoyed the support of the FMC due to
that agency's perception of the Soviet usurpation of U.S. maritime trade.n
Support from the FMC was critical to the success of the bill since it was the
target agency charged with implementing and enforcing the legislation. The
endorsement of H.R. 9998 by the FMC was tempered by the submission of two
amendments to the bill. First, the FMC wanted the authority to set a
minimum shipping rate if, in its determination, a carrier's rate was
unreasonable.' Secondly, the FMC sought statutory authority to obtain
government data from other agencies, provided that the release of such would
not endanger national security." The committee rejected both amendments,
26. Id. at 3-4. Originally, legislation to prevent rate-cutting was considered in the
94th Congress. A bill, H.R. 7940, was introduced to prevent Third Flag carriers from
charging rates that were not compensatory on a commercial cost basis. Opposition was
intense and the bill perished. Recognizing the need to narrow the focus of the legisla-
tion, H.R. 14564 was introduced containing the proviso that it would only apply -to
state-controlled carriers. The bill sought to prohibit carriers from charging rates below
those considered "just and reasonable." The bill faltered due to an agreement reached
by the FMC and the Soviet Ministry of Merchant Marine to limit rate-cutting. See
supra note 3. When this accord failed, H.R. 9998, the legislative embryo of the Ocean
Shipping Act of 1978, was introduced on Nov. 3, 1977 before the 95th Congress.
27. See H.R. REP. No. 1381 at 4. Initial testimony was before the House Subcom-
mittee on Merchant Marine. Among those interests present and testifying were the
FMC, the Maritime Administration, Sea-Land Services, Inc. and the Transportation
Institute, an industry interest group. In addition, a statement for the record was sub-
mitted by the Council of European and Japanese National Shipowners Associations.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 5. For a cogent discussion of some of the problems inherent in analyzing
the liner industry and its rate structure, see Ellsworth, Competition or Rationalization
in the Liner Industry, 10 J. MARITIME L. & COM. 497 (1979).
30. See H.R. REP. No. 1381 at 5.
31. Id. In addition to this policy consideration, the committee was of the opinion
that such a provision would be contrary to the Federal Reports Act of 1942, 44 U.S.C.
§ 3501 et. seq. which governs the exchange of information between government agen-
cies. Other policy factors militating against its adoption were that it would discourage
people from volunteering confidential information to other agencies and would set a
bad precedent by giving the FMC broad access to the files of other agencies.
THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW JOURNAL
the former because it was seen as an unwarranted extension of regulatory
power over foreign carriers and the latter because there was no evidence
submitted to the committee that the FMC had ever been denied a legit-
imate request for documents.32 Nevertheless, the amendments provided
an indication of the FMC's interest in having new statutory weapons with
which to monitor and check the shipping practices of controlled carriers.
Another important participant in the hearings on H.R. 9998 was the
Maritime Administration of the Department of Commerce. The importance of
support from the Maritime Administration centered on the supposition that
its views are closely associated with those of the Executive Office. In fact, the
Maritime Administration did support H.R. 9998 based on its concern that the
controlled carriers' practice of rate-cutting would eventually damage U.S.
liner trade to the point of frustrating the purpose of the Merchant Marine Act
of 1936.11 With the support of the FMC and the Maritime Administration, the
prospects of H.R. 9998 becoming law increased considerably. In addition to
these two agencies, testimonial support was received from the State and
Justice Departments. 3 After a short presentation by the State Department,
the Justice Department appeared before the committee to present its views
and those of the Carter administration, since the latter had by then
formulated its position on HR. 9998. These views were crucial to the
formulation of the Act since accommodation of foreign policy considerations
was essential for legislation having the potential to affect foreign commerce
on a major scale.
CARTER ADMINISTRATION AMENDMENTS
In essence, the Carter administration supported H.R. 9998 but with
several specific reservations. These reservations were constructively pre-
sented in the form of proposed amendments and transmitted to the committee
by the Justice Department. The first proposal defined a zone of reasonable-
32. The informal influence accorded MarAd views would be reduced by a provision
in the proposed Omnibus Maritime Bill, H.R. 4769, that would create the position of
Deputy Special Representative for Maritime Affairs in the Office of the Special Repre-
sentative for Trade Negotiation in the White House. Thus, if passed, the bill would give
the White House its own spokesman in this area.
33. See H.R. REP. No. 1381, at 8. With one exception, the amendments offered by
the State Department were similar to those offered by the Department of Justice. To
avoid redundancy, only those amendments offered by the Justice Department are consi-
dered here. The State Department amendment that received separate consideration and
was rejected would have allowed the FMC to exercise its own discretion in determining
which rates to review rather than upon request.
34. Id. at 6-7.
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ness within which shipping rates could be evaluated. The amendment
attempted to delineate a system whereby rates could be classified as
presumptively just and reasonable or not. 5 Specifically, the proposal would
allow controlled carriers a fifteen percent differential in its rate structure as
compared to that of the conference rates." The committee concluded that
adoption of this provision would vitiate the purpose of H.R. 9998 and thus, it
was rejected. 7 A second portion of the amendment would have required a full
evidentiary hearing by the FMC before it could suspend, reject or disapprove
special rates offered by controlled carriers." The primary concern was the
Soviets' increased use of FAK (freight-all-kinds) rates" and the difficulty
inherent in comparing these rates with those of other carriers. The obvious
loophole in this amendment would allow a controlled carrier to avoid or delay
rate suspensions simply by varying its rates from those of other shippers. For
this reason, the amendment was rejected.
A second amendment had as its objective the provision for a presidential
override of FMC actions based on foreign policy considerations."' Recognizing
that actions taken by the FMC based on economic criteria concomitantly
produced political effects, the amendment was adopted with minor changes,
primarily, safeguards on the exercise of this power.4 That the FMC did not
35. See S. REP. No. 1260 at 14. It has been suggested that the Soviets set their
rates anywhere from 10-50 percent below standard conference rates. For example, on
the North Atlantic-European Trade Route, Soviet rates were found to be up to 59 per-
cent below that of the major independents.
36. That the Administration proposed this amendment is curious. By allowing a
controlled carrier a constant 15 percent rate under that of the conferences, the competi-
tive price margin could conceivably be reduced until all but controlled carriers re-
mained in operation.
37. See H.R. REP. No. 1381 at 7.
38. See Pansius, Plotting the Return of Isbrandtsen: The Illegality of Interconfer-
ence Rate Agreements, 9- Transp. L. J. 337 (1977). The article contains an overview of
the antitrust considerations inherent in rate setting.
39. FAK (Freight-all-kinds) rates are general per container rates encompassing a
wide spectrum of commodities. Generally, shippers will set a specific rate for each type
of cargo transported. FAK rates are especially tailored to the Soviets' use of intermodal
vessels in their merchant fleet.
40. See H.R. REP. No. 1381 at 8. The proposal is not novel. The president has
similar authority over decisions of the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB). See 49 U.S.C.
§ 1461(b) (1970); (power over tariff rejections or suspensions of foreign air carriers by
the CAB).
41. Id. The committee's changes required that a presidential override be exercised
within 10 days of FMC action and be accompanied by a detailed explanation of why the
FMC's action was overriden. Essentially, the changes formalized a safeguard to pre-
vent abuse of the provision.
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vigorously protest the adoption of this amendment indicates its appreciation
of the integral nature of commerce and diplomacy.
The third amendment was designed to eliminate the FMC's authority to
prescribe minimum rates for a carrier during the period of suspension.
Expressing concern over the principle of extending U.S. regulatory authority
over foreign commerce, the committee checked the power of the FMC and
adopted the amendment. Moreover, the committee was of the opinion that
allowing the FMC to exercise such power was unnecessary for implementa-
tion of the bill.
The fourth proposed amendment attempted to frame a precise definition
of the factors to be considered when evaluating whether a controlled carrier's
rates are just and reasonable.43 The committee, however, was of the opinion
that an adequate definition already existed in the statutes, and thus, the
amendment was declined. Behind this decision was a feeling that the FMC
should have greater discretion in selecting comparable vessels for cost
comparison purposes.4 4 As will be discussed below, the first litigation to arise
from the Act has generated reams of analysis and argument on what is just
and reasonable. This is an extremely flexible and broad standard, particularly
since the rates in shipping are responsive to minor external effects.
A fifth amendment was aimed at removing the requirement that
controlled carriers give thirty days notice before effectuating any rate
reductions." This amendment was rejected on two grounds: first, a controlled
carrier intent on predatory practices could severely disrupt the shipping
market with sudden rate decreases. The thirty day notice requirement
cushions the effect of rate decreases and provides notice to the FMC of the
carrier's intent. Second, a controlled carrier acting for legitimate reasons
could do so upon receiving special permission from the FMC and avoid any
harshness inherent in the provision.
The last amendment, which was adopted without much discussion,
requires that the FMC rule on suspended rates within 180 days of the
suspension. The sole basis for the provision was to eliminate any unjust
vulnerability imposed on a controlled carrier by an indefinite suspension
period.
42. Id. at 9.
43. Id. The key to a new definition was in allowing constructive costs to be substi-
tuted for a controlled carrier's actual costs in operation. Constructive cost was defined
as the costs of another non-controlled carrier operating similar vessels and equipment
and operating in similar conditions. The difficulty in using this provision is that simi-
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Opposition to H.R. 9998 was primarily from those interests in the United
States that would be adversely affected by close regulation of controlled
carriers."6 For instance, the National Industrial Traffic League 7 opposed the
bill as being inapposite to its policy of keeping regulation of ocean
transportation in foreign commerce to an absolute minimum." Opposition
from the Great Lakes Commission and the Illinois Department of Business
and Economic Development centered on the fact that Eastern-bloc carriers
provided a substantial service to the Great Lakes region. The committee
acknowledged the legitimate nature of this complaint and adopted an
amendment to H.R. 9998 providing that it would not apply to any trade route
served exclusively by controlled carriers. In sum, if U.S. carriers choose not to
compete, then the rates charged by a controlled carrier would not be
challenged. At this time, the hearings ended and with the designated
amendments in place, H.R. 9998 passed to the Senate. 9
SENATE CONSIDERATION
Consideration of S. 2873, a bill almost identical to H.R. 9998, was
undertaken by the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transporta-
tion. Whereas the House committee focused heavily on the practical and
economic aspects of the bill, the Senate committee was attuned to the Soviet
political and military objectives in monopolizing ocean shipping routes and
projecting influence.' This is not to say that the committee did not examine
46. Id. at 11-12. In consonance with the other amendments proposed by the Justice
Department and the Administration, the thrust of this amendment was parity.
47. See Heine, supra note 14, at 92. It should be noted that although "controlled
carrier" is synonymous with the Soviet merchant marine throughout this discussion,
there are other Socialist-bloc controlled carriers active in maritime trade. For example,
the Polish merchant fleet will have a projected 6.5-7.8 million dwt. of shipping capac-
ity by 1980 with a projected increase to 13.3-21.7 million dwt. by 1990. In addition, the
Socialist-bloc countries have formed the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
(CMEA) to strengthen the position of socialist countries in global commerce. CMEA
membership consists of Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Po-
land, Romania and the U.S.S.R. See General Council of British Shipping, Summary of
Press Reports from Eastern Europe and Elsewhere (August 7, 1975).
48. The National Industrial Traffic League (NITL) represents 1,800 shippers,
chambers of commerce and others interested in ocean liner services. The NITL argued
that interference with commercially negotiated rates, as it considered controlled carrier
rates to be, would be detrimental to the international trading capacity of U.S. industry.
49. See H.R. REP. No. 1381 at p. 11. On July 31, 1978 the House passed H.R. 9998
by a vote of 329-6.
50. See, e.g., Expansion of the Soviet Merchant Marine into the U.S. Maritime
Trades, U.S. Department of Commerce, Maritime Administration (1977). See also, Ack-
ley, supra note 10.
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the traditional rationales for Soviet practice such as the need to generate
hard currency5 through increased exports and shipping business; these
factors were recognized. The Senate committee also appreciated the integral
function assigned the Soviet merchant fleet in augmenting the wartime
capacity of the Soviet blue water naval fleets.; In its report, the committee
drew a direct correlation between the U.S.S.R.'s rate cutting practices and its
plans for the strategic projection of seapower. " That is, the Senate recognized
that a peacetime merchant fleet is the dormant component of wartime naval
power.
With these premises in mind, the commiteee examined the amendments
decided upon by the House committee. Not surprisingly, the Senate
committee was in general accord with the actions taken by the House. Noted
in its considerations was the fact that the Maritime Administration had
indicated to the House committee that it did not condition its support of H.R.
9998 on the Department of Justice amendments. Apparently, the Maritime
Administration and the Carter administration did not have harmonious
views in this area.' Finally, it was noted that the United States was not
alone in its concern over the Soviet rate-setting practice. In fact, two other
major maritime nations, Japan and Holland, have responded to Soviet
competitive pressures by enacting legislation aimed at preventing disruptive
intrusions into the liner shipping industry.' Without more, S.2873 (H.R.
51. As of 1978, the U.S.S.R. had a hard currency deficit of approximately $16 bil-
lion. See S. REP. No. 1260 at 16-17. The significance of the Soviet need for hard curren-
cy is that it is necessary to obtain purchasing power for western technological products,
equipment and grain. Payment for these goods requires hard currencies such as the
dollar, deutsche mark, pound sterling and French franc. The Soviet Union's currency
standard, the ruble, is not responsive to an international monetary standard. As of
December 1977, the ruble was valued by U.S. banks at .75 to $1.00. As of March, 1980,
the rate of exchange was .64 to $1.00.
52. See S. REP. No. 1260 at 15-16. In the report, the following quote from Admiral
of the Soviet Fleet Sergi Gorshkov's Mahanesque treatise "Seapower of the State" is set
forth:
Shipping is an important component of a nation's seapower .... The goal of
Soviet seapower is to effectively utilize the world ocean in the interest of building
communism.. . . The maritime shipping of the U.S.S.R. has become a dominant,
technically well-equipped and highly profitable branch of the national economy,
which fully meetsthe economic needs of the nation. Id.
53. Id. at 15-18.
54. Id. Although the Maritime Administration is said to reflect Administration
views, it nevertheless expresses its own views in its testimony before Congress.
55. Id. at 24-25. In 1977, Japan enacted a new maritime transportation law, the
purpose of which is to provide government control over nonconference shipping opera-
tions in Japan's oceanic commerce. Holland's version of this type of legislation, The
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9998) was reported out of committee on September 21, 1978 by a unanimous
vote.
ANALYSIS OF THE LEGISLATION
The United States has long recognized the unique nature of the maritime
industry. The industry as a whole has enjoyed special considerations with
respect to legislative control. For example, the antitrust laws have been
applied in a manner that affords a degree of immunity from them.1 On the
whole, the government's inclination has been to balance the need for a
regulated and competitive shipping industry.,' Ultimately, the test of the
Ocean Shipping Act of 1978, and similar legislation to come, will be how well
it balances the need for regulation and competition. Should the Soviets be
prevented from any competition, the health of the U.S. Merchant Marine
might fare as poorly as with the present mode of competition.
The changes effectuated by H.R. 9998 can be found within two statutory
provisions: § 801 (2), the definitional section, and § 817 (c), a new addition.
Section 801 (2) was amended to define a controlled carrier in terms that
would include Third Flag carriers such as the Soviet Union.' The purpose of
this provision was to provide a workable methodology for classifying
Maritime Shipping Retortion Act entered into force on June 14, 1977. This bill provides
for, among other things, retaliatory action against predatory Soviet shipping practices.
In addition, Belgium, West Germany and the United Kingdom have protested the rate-
cutting activities of the U.S.S.R.
56. See 46 US.C. § 814 (1970). See also Federal Maritime Board v. Isbrandtsen, 356
U.S. 481 (1958); FMC v. Seatrain Lines, 411 U.S. 726 (1973). See generally Antitrust
Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary, REPORT ON TIIE OCEAN
FREIGHT INDUSTRY, H.R. REP. No. 1414, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962).
57. But see Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conference, 383 U.S. 213, 217,
modified, 383 U.S. 932 (1966) (Court held the Shipping Act of 1916 did not impliedly
repeal all antitrust regulation of rate-making activities of the shipping industry). See
also Latin America/Pacific Coast Steamship Conf. v. FMC, 465 F.2d 542 (D.C. Cir.,
cert. denied 409 U.S. 967 (1972), Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 517 F.2d
734 (2nd Cir. 1975). (regulation of competion in the commercial aviation field).
58. 46 U.S.C. § 801 The text of the addition is as follows:
"Iclontrolled carrier" means a common carrier by water operating, offering or
proposing to offer service in the foreign commerce of the United States which
carrier is or whose operating assets are directly or indirectly owned or controlled
by the government under whose registry the vessels of the controlled carrier oper-
ate. Ownership or control by such government shall be deemed to exist if a major-
ity portion of the interest in the carrier is owned or controlled in any manner by
such government, by any agency of the government, or by any person, corporation,
or entity controlled by such government. Ownership or control shall also be
deemed to exist if the government has the right to appoint or disapprove the
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controlled carriers. The committee was of the opinion that by modifying the
definition, all possible schemes for governmental control over shipping lines,
whether direct or indirect, would be covered. 46 U.S.C. § 801 essentially
states that a carrier whose assets are either directly or indirectly controlled
by the government under which it is registered will be classified as a
"controlled carrier." The committee felt a comprehensive and broad definition
of what constituted a controlled carrier was necessary. The committee's
inclusion of ship registry as a factor in determining which government
controls a carrier was based on a belief that to look beyond the vessel's flag to
determine nationality or ownership would be inconsistent with general
international practice.5 9 The use of a ship's registry standard also made
practical sense. Multinational corporations often create a web of ownership,
charters and sales that would defy attempts to trace nationality." Lastly, it
was recognized that state-controlled lines would be unlikely participants in
registering under flags of convenience since controlled carrier countries have
frequently and publicly voiced opposition to flag of convenience registry. "
The heart of H.R. 9998 is manifested in the addition of a new subsection
to the Shipping Act of 1916.62 In essence, the new section prohibits controlled
carriers from maintaining rates or tariffs that are below a level determined
by the FMC to be just and reasonable."' Before stating what the new section
appointment of a majority of the directors or the chief operating or executive offic-
er of the carrier. Id.
The following countries have vessels operating as controlled carriers:
Algeria Hungary Philippines
Bangladesh India Poland
Brazil Indonesia Saudi Arabia
Bulgaria Ivory Coast Sierra Leone
Burma Kenya Singapore
Chile Kuwait South Africa
People's Republic Libya Sri Lanka
of China Malaysia Syria
Czechoslovakia Malta Tanzania
Egypt Mexico Trinidad
German Democratic Nigeria Turkey
Republic (E. Germany) Oman U.S.S.R.
Ghana Pakistan Venezuela
Guatemala Peru Zaire
59. See H.R. REP. No. 1381 at 22-23.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. 46 U.S.C. § 814 et. seq. (1972)
63. See 46 U.S.C. § 817 (c). See generally Com. of Pennsylvania v. FMC, 392 F.
Supp. 795 (D.C.D.C. 1975).
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adds to the Shipping Act, it is necessary to briefly examine the deficiencies in
the old statutory language.
The Ocean Shipping Act of 1978 was designed to correct the weaknesses
of § 18 (b)(5) of the Shipping Act of 1916.1 That section gave the FMC the
authority to disapprove any common carrier's rate or charge found to be
unreasonably high or low so as to be harmful to U.S. commerce. The difficulty
with the standard was in determining what constituted an unreasonably low
rate. The use of high rates posed no problem because there is no possibility of
competitive undercutting. With respect to the low rates, there was a total
absence of standards by which the FMC could adjudge a rate as unreasonably
low. Moreover, the FMC lacked any power to suspend a suspect carrier's rates
pending the resolution of the rate investigation. Thus, if economic harm
occurred, it would continue throughout the course of an often lengthy
investigation.
A subtle, but more important difficulty with the old statute was that the
burden of proof in an FMC rate investigation was on the FMC or the
complaining party.' Thus, as the committee noted in drafting H.R. 9998, to
satisfy the burden of proof, the complaining party would have to establish a
prima facie case of unreasonableness before the carrier would be required to
proffer any evidence in support of its rates. In so allocating the burden of
proof, Congress effectively discouraged those who might challenge a carrier's
rates.
Under prior statutory language, it was generally recognized that two
criteria had to be present before a carrier's rates could be suspended. There
had to be a finding that existing rates were below the out-of-pocket costs of
the carrier and a finding that the rate caused an adverse economic impact.
Satisfying these two criteria was difficult because of the complex economic
structure of the shipping industry. By manipulating figures, even predatory
rate practices could be couched in justifying language. The final major
weakness under section 18(b)(5) lay in the fact that a finding of unreason-
ableness was prospective only in nature. Since a carrier's rates could not be
suspended during a rate investigation, an eventual finding of unreasonable-
ness placed the FMC in the embarrassing position of being limited to
64. See 46 U.S.C. § 817 (b) (5).
The Commission shall disapprove any rate or charge filed by a common car-
rier by water in the foreign commerce of the United States or conference of car-
riers which, after hearing, it finds to be so unreasonably high or low as to be
detrimental to the commerce of the United States.
This section was enacted in 1961 by the 87th Congress and reflects few of the concerns
of its later entity, the 95th Congress.
65. Id.
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proscribing those rates in the future, with no ability to recoup the damage
caused by the low rates prior to a final determination." The onerous burden
of conducting litigation under the statute resulted in it falling into relative
desuetude by the early 1970s. The Ocean Shipping Act of 1978 attempted to
correct many of the weaknesses of the old statute through a new system of
regulatory criteria.
The Ocean Shipping Act of 1978 is, in somewhat simplistic terms, a
legislative bootstrap for the FMC. The enforcement mechanism for the
legislation is contained in the FMC's authority to disapprove, after appropri-
ate notice and explanation, any rates, charges, classifications, rules or
regulations which fail to meet a standard of justness and reasonableness. The
determination of what is just and reasonable hinges on a variety of empirical
and nonempirical variables.6 7 There is, however, a common thread in the
criteria set forth in the statute. Any rate charged by a controlled carrier that
would be below that charged by a commercially motivated carrier for a
sustained period of time will be suspect.
In essence, the FMC has been given, within this statutory framework, a
great deal of power and an equal amount of flexibility in wielding it. In so
doing, the FMC is charged with evaluating each controlled carrier according
to the relevant factors in each case.'
Section 3 of the 1978 Ocean Shipping Act amended § 18 of the 1916
Shipping Act by adding § c, which contains six subsections, each one
reflecting a legislative response to or recognition of a problem in rate
regulation. A brief discussion of each section is necessary to fully understand
the changes and additions to the FMC's rate regulation powers.
1. The first subsection contains the requirement that rates set by a
controlled carrier be just and reasonable.1 Of paramount importance is that
66. See H.R. REP. No. 1381 at 20.
67. 46 U.S.C. § 814 (c) (2). Among those listed: evidence that the controlled carrier
is operating below a level that is fully compensatory; rate comparisons with carriers
operating similar vessels in similar trades; the rates necessary to assure the transport
of specific cargoes in trade; or the rates necessary to maintain an acceptable level of
service to and from the affected ports.
68. See S. REP. No. 1260, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
69. See 46 U.S.C. § 817 (c) (1):
No controlled carrier subject to this chapter shall maintain rates or charges in
its tariffs filed with the Commission that are below a level which is just and
reasonable, nor shall any such carrier establish or maintain unjust or unreason-
able classifications, rules, or regulations in such tariffs. An unjust or unreasonable
classification, rule, or regulation means one which results or is likely to result in
the carriage or handling of cargo at rates or charges which are below a level which
is just and reasonable. The Commission may at any time after notice and hearing,
disapprove any rates, charges, classifications, rules, or regulations which the con-
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Congress specifically shifted the burden of proving that rates are just and
reasonable from the complaining party to the controlled carrier."0 This
procedural shift favors an activist role for the FMC rather than the passive
one assigned to it under the earlier statute. It is interesting to note that the
language of the statute distinguishes between rates and charges in a tariff
and classifications, and rules and regulations contained within a tariff.7'
With respect to the former, there is a prohibition on setting rates or tariffs
below a level that is just or reasonable. With regard to the latter, however,
the wording is in the negative, namely that the classifications, rules and
regulations not be unjust or unreasonable. 2 The amendment provides a
precise definition of what is to be considered unjust or unreasonable but does
not define what is to be considered just and reasonable.7 3 This is in
consonance with the statutory scheme of keeping the determination of
justness and reasonableness flexible and open to FMC interpretation. The
division in the language is intentional and reflects a Congressional desire to
avoid ambiguity arising from associating classifications, rules and regula-
tions with a presumptively just and reasonable level.7' The committee reports
on this section contain a specific caveat that in all cases arising under the
section, the burden of proof on these standards will be on the controlled
carrier.5
2. The second subsection provides the mechanics for working with the
just and reasonable standard." The subsection lists appropriate factors to be
trolled carrier has failed to demonstrate to be just and reasonable. In any proceed-
ing under this subsection, the burden of proof shall be on the controlled carrier to
demonstrate that its rates, charges, classifications, rules, or regulations are just
and reasonable. Rates, charges, classifications, rules, or regulations filed by a con-
trolled carrier which have been rejected, suspended, or disapproved by the Com-
mission are void, and their use is unlawful.
70. Id. Note that the language of the statute states in pertinent part that: "In any
proceeding under this subsection, the burden of proof shall be on the controlled-carrier
to demonstrate that its rates, charges, classifications, rules, or regulations are just and
reasonable."
71. Id.
72. See S. REP. No. 1260 at 31.
73. 46 U.S.C. § 817 (c) (1): "lain unjust or unreasonable classification, rule or reg-
ulation means one which results or is likely to result in the carriage or handling of
cargo at rates or charges which are below a level which is just and reasonable."
74. See S. REP. No. 1260 at 31.
75. Id.
76. 46 U.S.C. § 817 (c) (2):
(2) For the purposes of this subsection, in determining whether rates,
charges, classifications, rules or regulations by a controlled carrier are just and
reasonable, the Commission may take into account appropriate factors, including,
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considered in determining which rates are just and reasonable. Since it is not
necessary for the FMC to consider each factor listed every time it reviews a
rate, the FMC may be somewhat selective in using this list. Furthermore, the
FMC has the power to add new criteria since the list is not exhaustive.
Congress intended that the FMC flesh out that statutory framework for
dealing with the just and reasonable standard. Among the factors set forth in
the statute are: carrier costs; the relationship of the challenged rates to other
rates; the necessity of the rates for the cargo to move; and the level and
quality of service provided.77 Of particular importance to the litigator is the
cost factor. The amendment allows rates to be justified if fully compensatory
to the controlled carrier based on its actual costs or constructive costs.
Constructive costs are defined as the costs of a non-controlled carrier
operating similar vessels and equipment in the same or similar trade."8 It is
this factor that presents problems.
The use of constructive cost comparisons in rate investigations was
sanctioned by Congress because of the anticipated problems inherent in
working with the actual costs of state-controlled carriers."9 One of the
problems encountered in ,using constructive cost comparisons is the conflict
between the realities of a market versus a command economy. State-
controlled carriers need not use profit concepts in their accounting proce-
dures. They can set rates which ignore costs necessary to carriers from
market economies. The FMC has been reluctant to use constructive costs in
rate comparisons due to the above problem. Yet, due to the statutory
language, the FMC must accommodate the constructive cost analysis to a
practicable standard of rate evaluation. The ultimate resolution of this issue
will be essential to effective implementation of the Shipping Act.8"
The FMC will also have to refine the just and reasonable standard. Since
the FMC is allowed to choose from a number of factors relating to operation
but not limited to, whether: (i) the rates or charges which have been filed or which
would result from the pertinent classifications, rules, or regulations are below a
level which is fully compensatory to the controlled carrier based upon that car-
rier's actual costs or upon its constructive costs, which are hereby defined as the
costs of another carrier, other than a controlled carrier, operating similar vessels
and equipment in the same or a similar trade; (ii) the rates, charges, classifica-
tions, rules, or regulations are the same as or similar to those filed or assessed by
other carriers in the same trade; (iii) the rates, charges, classifications, rules, or
regulations are required to assure movement of particular cargo in the trade; or
(iv) the rates, charges, classifications, rules, or regulations are required to main-




79. See H.R. REP. No. 1381 at 24.
80. 46 U.S.C. § 817 (c) (2).
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and the factual variables in each case are to be given substantial considera-
tion, no conclusive explanation of the just and reasonable standard can be
arrived at from an analysis of the statute or its legislative history.
3. The third subsection of the amendment states the requirement that
a controlled carrier file all rates, charges, classifications rules or regulations,
including those effecting rate decreases, at least thirty days prior to their
effective date.8' In addition, upon request by the FMC, the carrier has twenty
days to file a justification of its existing or proposed rates, rules and
classifications. 82 The filing is conducted in accordance with the rules of
procedure for the FMC.M The justification required of a controlled carrier is to
show that its rates are necessary, just and reasonable. It is established that a
point by point comparison of one commodity rate to another is inappropriate
and insufficient to satisfy the burden of proof placed on the controlled carrier
to show that its rates are just and reasonable.' What is required is a detailed
statement of the carrier's need for and purpose of the proposed rates, charges,
classifications and rules.
4. The fourth subsection of the amendment provides that upon a finding
that a carrier's rates are unjust and unreasonable, the FMC may issue an
order to the carrier requiring it to show cause why its rates, charges,
classifications, rules or regulations should not be disapproved.' Pending
81. See 46 U.S.C. § 817 (c) (3):
(3) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) (2) of this section, rates,
charges, classifications, rules, or regulations of controlled carriers shall not, with-
out special permission of the Commission, become effective within less than thirty
days following the date of filing with the Commission. Following the effective date
of this subsection, each controlled carrier shall, upon the request of the Commis-
sion, file within twenty days of request, with respect to its existing or proposed
rates, charges, classifications, rules, or regulations a statement of justification
which sufficiently details the controlled carrier's need and purpose for such rates,
charges, classifications, rules, or regulations, upon which the Commission may
reasonably base its determination of the lawfulness thereof.
It should be noted that this requirement can be avoided by petitioning the FMC and
receiving special permission to act otherwise. Id.
82. Id.
83. See 46 C.F.R. § 502 et. seq. (1979).
84. See S. REP. No. 1260 at 32.
85. 46 U.S.C. § 817 (c) (4):
(4) Whenever the Commission is of the opinion that the rates, charges, clas-
sifications, rules, or regulations filed by a controlled carrier may be unjust and
unreasonable, the Commission may issue an order to the controlled carrier to show
cause why such rates, charges, classifications, rules, or regulations should not be
disapproved. Pending a determination as to their lawfulness in such a proceeding,
the Commission may suspend such rates, charges, classifications, rules, or regula-
tions at any time prior to their effective date. In the case of any rates, charges,
classifications, rules, or regulations which have already become effective, the
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ultimate resolution of the invesitgation, the FMC is authorized to suspend
the rates or regulations prior to their effective date.8 If, on the other hand,
the rates have already become effective, the FMC is required to give sixty
days notice before suspension and the suspension period may not exceed 180
days. To prevent unjust hardship, the controlled carrier may file new rates at
any time after the FMC has acted. It should be noted, however, that these
rates are also subject to suspension if deemed by the FMC to be unjust and
unreasonable." The show cause order acts as a signal to the controlled carrier
that documentary data must be forthcoming to substantiate all claims of
reasonableness.
From a review of litigation conducted under this Act to date, it appears
that the data necessary to respond to a show cause order is voluminous,
detailed and often supplemented by affidavits of economists and transporta-
tion analysts in support of the proposed rates.88 A failure to cooperate with
the FMC - i.e., by refusing to produce sufficient evidence required by the
show cause order - can lead to litigation in the federal courts. In addition,
the FMC can petition the courts for an order revoking the putative
wrongdoers' access to U.S. ports pending satisfactory compliance with the
provisions of the statute.
5. The fifth subsection of the amendment is a provision for presidential
override of the FMC's actions with respect to a controlled carrier.' The
section requires the FMC, upon publication of an order of suspension or a
final order of disapproval of rates or regulations, to concurrently transmit a
Commission may, upon the issuance of an order to show cause, suspend such rates,
charges, classifications, rules, or regulations on not less than sixty days notice to
the controlled carrier. No period of suspension hereunder may be greater than one
hundred and eighty days. Whenever the Commission has suspended any rates,
charges, classifications, rules, or regulations under this provision, the affected car-
rier may file new rates, charges, classifications, rules, or regulations to take effect
immediately during the suspension period in lieu of the suspended rates, charges,
classifications, rules, or regulations: Provided, however, That the Commission may
reject such new rates, charges, classifications, rules, or regulations if it is of the
opinion that they are unjust and unreasonable.
86. Id.
87. Id. See also H.R. REP. No. 1381 at 25.
88. Re Far Eastern Shipping Co. Rate Cases FMC Docket No. 79-10, March 2,
1979. All documents, an original and 15 copies, submitted by parties to a FMC proceed-
ing are kept in the Docket Room of the Secretary, Federal Maritime Commission, 1100
L Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20573.
89. 46 U.S.C. § 817 (c)(5).
Concurrently with the publication thereof, the Commission shall transmit to
the President any order of suspension or final order of disapproval of rates,
charges, classifications, rules, or regulations of a controlled carrier subject to the
provisions of this subsection. Within ten days after the receipt or the effective date
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copy of the order to the President." From the time of receipt, the President
has ten days or until the effective date of the final order, whichever is later,
to request, in writing, that the FMC stay the order for reasons of national
defense or foreign policy. The FMC is required to immediately grant the
request through the issuance of an order." Several safeguards are inherent in
this provision to prevent abuse. First, the President must specifically state
the national defense or foreign policy rationale underlying his request.
Second, whenever practicable, the President must attempt to resolve the
inhibiting issue with the applicable foreign government.' It should also be
noted that this section does not give the President carte blanche veto power
over all FMC orders. Rather, the Congress intended that this section should
be construed narrowly and only for valid national defense or foreign policy
reasons. Moreover, there exists no authority for presidential interference
with an FMC order once the statutory time limit has expired.
Although this provision is relatively simple in application, it represents
two fundamental precepts: the constitutional division of powers reserving the
right to conduct foreign policy to the Executive branch of government; and
the symbiotic association of commercial actions to diplomatic reactions. This
is especially true when the legislation is designed solely to affect vessels in
the service of foreign governments.' In effect, this section embodies the
rationale behind the whole of the Ocean Shipping Act of 1978, which is an
integration of economically-oriented commercial regulation with foreign
policy and national defense considerations.
6. The sixth and final subsection of the amendment may be the most
appropriate starting place for one confronted with representing a controlled
carrier whose rates have come to the attention of the FMC. This provision
of such Commission order, whichever is later, the President may request the Com-
mission in writing to stay the effect of the Commission's order if he finds that such
stay is required for reasons of national defense or foreign policy which reasons
shall be specified in the report. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the
Commission shall immediately grant such request by the issuance of an order in
which the President's request shall be described. During any such stay; the Presi-
dent shall, whenever practicable, attempt to resolve the matter in controversy by




93. See S. REP. No. 1260 at 33.
94. Id. This provision is not unique. A close corollary can be found in 49 U.S.C.
§ 1461 (b) which gives the president similar powers with respect to foreign air carriers
regulated by the Civil Aeronautics Board. The legislative history of the amendment
indicates that in the years from 1973-78, the president invoked his privilege 18 times
to affect CAB actions.
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provides all of the exemption criteria that will insulate a controlled carrier
from the provisions of the Act. 5 There are five basic exceptions for controlled
carriers. First, all controlled carriers entitled by a treaty of the United States
to receive national or most-favored-nation treatment are excepted from the
Act . 6 The second exemption applies to controlled carriers whose state of
95. 6 U.S.C. § 817 (c)(6):
The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to: (i) any controlled carrier
of a state whose vessels are entitled by a treaty of the United States to receive
national or most-favored-nation treatment; (ii) any controlled carrier of a state
which, on the effective date of this subsection, has subscribed to the statement of
shipping policy contained in note 1 to annex A of the Code of Liberalization of
Current Invisible Operations, adopted by the Council of the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development; (iii) rates, charges, classifications, rules, or
regulations of any controlled carrier in any particular trade which are covered by
an agreement approved under section 814 of this title, other than an agreement in
which all of the members are controlled carriers not otherwise excluded from the
provisions of this subsection; (iv) rates, charges, classifications, rules, or regula-
tions governing the transportation of cargo by a controlled carrier between the
country by whose government it is owned or controlled, as defined herein, and the
United States, or any of its districts, territories, or possessions; or (v) a trade
served exclusively by controlled carriers.
96. Id. The following is a list of countries not affected by the provisions of the Act
























It should be noted that this list is not inclusive since carriers from other countries may
qualify for exemption based on their trade rates or membership in a liner conference.
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registry has subscribed to the statement of shipping policy contained in note
1 to annex A of the Code of Liberalization of Current Invisible Operations as
adopted by the Council of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development.97 Third, rates, charges, rules, regulations and classifications of
a controlled carrier covered by the liner conference provisions of the Shipping
Act of 1916, other than a controlled carriers conference, will be exempt from
the Act." Fourth, an exemption is made for a controlled carrier operating in
bilateral trade between the carrier's host state and the United States. In
essence, this provision exempts non-Third Flag controlled carriers.9 Finally,
a controlled carrier operating in a trade route served exclusively by
controlled carriers is exempt from theAct.1'
All but the last provision are structured so as to insure that controlled
carriers operating outside of the Act will be covered by other codes or controls
having similar objectives to those of the Act. The last exception, however, is
merely a legislative recognition that where a controlled carrier operates on a
route not serviced by noncontrolled carriers, it cannot be said that it is
engaging in anti-competitive practices.'' If an initial review of these
provisions implies a broad range of loopholes, that is partially correct. A
careful application of the exceptions, however, reveals that the Act remains
applicable to those controlled carriers it was designed to affect - the socialist
bloc controlled carriers. In that sense, these exceptions are not nearly as
important as might be initially perceived."°
FMC LITIGATION: THE FEsco LITIGATION
In order to provide a glimpse of how the Act is working, the following
discussion briefly analyzes the only set of cases to be litigated before the FMC
97. See supra note 93. Although the United States is a signatory to the Code of
Liberalization, the United States, in order to avoid a conflict with domestic laws, re-
frained from subscribing to Note 1 to Annex A. In all, 20 countries have subscribed to
the note, thus pledging to conduct their shipping policy on the premise of "free and fair"
competition. The Code seeks to eliminate restrictions on invisible transactions and
transfers, such as occurs in insurance, transportation and banking.
98. 46 U.S.C. § 814 provides for the organization of liner conferences under the
Shipping Act of 1916.
99. 46 U.S.C. § 817 (c) (6) (iv).
100. 46 U.S.C. § 817 (c) (6) (v). As noted earlier, this provision reflects the concern
of those in the Great Lakes region, which is heavily serviced by Socialist-bloc controlled
carriers, that the service provided by controlled carriers is essential to the vitality of
the regional economy.
101. See H.R. REP. No. 1381 at 11-12.
102. The exceptions are drafted so that compliance with one or more of them would
mitigate or eliminate the competitive advantages controlled carriers have over non-
controlled carriers, that is, state supported monopoly and subsidy.
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under the Act. Although they constitute three different actions by docket
number, all of the actions arise out of the FMC's investigation of the shipping
rates of the Far Eastern Shipping Company, a state-controlled carrier of the
U.S.S.R.03 The litigation, Re Rates of Far Eastern Shipping Company,", is
actually a series of actions, involving the same parties, before the FMC. The
substantive focus of the litigation is the rate-setting activities of the Far
Eastern Shipping Company (hereinafter referred to as FESCO), a state-
controlled carrier of the U.S.S.R. The procedural thrust of the litigation,
however, centers on the conduct of litigation within the parameters of the
Ocean Shipping Act of 1978. In particular, problems are already developing
with the "just and reasonable" standard and the constructive costs criteria set
forth in the Act. "0 Although the litigation is still in progress, an examination
of some of the issues raised up to this point provides useful insight into the
Act's potential and problems.
FESCO, a common carrier of the Soviet Union, provides liner service
between U.S. ports and ports located in the Far East, Australia, New Zealand
and the Philippines. All of the vessels employed by FESCO operate under the
registry of the U.S.S.R. As such, FESCO is a controlled carrier within the
meaning of the Act."0 The FMC initiated this litigation with a request that
FESCO file a statement of justification with respect to certain of its rates and
tariffs for liner service. The actual dispute over the rates charged by FESCO
involves complex economic analysis, contained in voluminous exhibits. In
essence, the FMC felt that FESCO's rates were significantly lower than those
of its non-controlled carrier competitors. Thus, the FMC issued a bifurcated
procedural notice that suspended FESCO's rates and ordered it to show cause
why its rates should not be disapproved."7 In conjunction with the latter
requirement, FESCO was ordered to demonstrate that its commodity rates
were just and reasonable. 0 ' The FMC dismissed FESCO's first attempt at rate
justification as incongruent with congressional intent, due to FESCO's
attempt to make a point to point comparison of its rates to those of similar
103. The Far Eastern Shipping Co. is known colloquially at the FMC as "FESCO."
104. Rates of Far Eastern Shipping Co., FMC Docket No.'s 79-10 (1979), 79-104
(1974) and 80-6 (1980). The docket books containing the briefs, orders, exhibits and
ancillary materials are on file at FMC headquarters at 1100 L Street N.W., Washing-
ton, D.C. The docket room is open to the public on a limited basis.
105. Id. See supra, text accompanying notes 69-79.
106. See 46 U.S.C. § 801.
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non-controlled carriers.1°9 In the same case, the FMC went on to state that 46
U.S.C. § 817 (c)(4) does not require the issuance of a show cause order
separate from the initial order of suspension."' In addition, the FMC held
that due process considerations do not require that a controlled carrier be
granted a hearing prior to the suspension of rates."' From these initial
encounters, it appears the FMC is fulfilling its congressionally sanctioned
role of filling in the framework of the Act.
The burden of initiating action in cases brought under the Act lies with
the FMC. Once an order is filed however, the burden of proving the
reasonableness of its rates lies with the carrier. Given the uncertainty over
which tests will be used by the FMC to measure the justness or reasonable-
ness of a carrier's rates, the burden of proof can be seen as more than a
procedural impediment; it is a substantive obstacle that can be very difficult
to surmount. That difficulty is compounded by conflicts over what criteria
will be sufficient to demonstrate the justness and reasonableness of a carrier's
rates.
In the continuing FESCO litigation, the controversy over what is just
and reasonable is at the forefront. The act sets forth criteria for measuring
which rates are just and reasonable;. these criteria are not, however,
conclusive or limiting. In the instant cases, the FMC and FESCO have their
own differing concepts of the methodology necessary to discharge the burden
of proof needed to respond to the FMC's show cause order."' In particular,
the FMC feels that FESCO's attempt to justify its rates by means of
comparison to selective rates of non-controlled carriers is not in consonance
with the type of justification envisioned by Congress."4 FESCO wanted to
compare individual commodity rates to those of selected non-controlled
carriers."' The FMC has rejected this approach in favor of a comparison of
entire rate structures.16
The flexibility of the Act may actually tie down the FMC and strain its
resources as it struggles to define the parameters of the Act in a practical
109. See Re Rates of Far Eastern Shipping Co., FMC Docket No. 79-10. (March 2,
1979).
110. See Re Rates of Far Eastern Shipping Co., FMC Docket No. 79-10. (May 23,
1979).
111. Id.
112. 46 U.S.C. § 817(c)(2). See supra text at notes 69-79.
113. See Re Rates of Far Eastern Shipping Co., FMC Docket No. 79-10, 2-4 (March
2, 1979).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 3-4.
116. See H.R. REP. No. 1381 at 7-8.
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context. The FMC may not be up to this task without more funding and
manpower."7
In its reply memorandum to the FMC, FESCO attempted to rely on a
constructive costs analysis to justify its rates."8 Basically, FESCO contended
that its rates were compensatory under the constructive costs standard and,
moreover, appropriate under the alternative review provisions of the Act. The
FMC, however, indicated that the constructive cost standard is applicable
only to across the board rate comparisons and not to individual commodity
rates."9 Instead, the FMC has favored the formulation provided by its
transportation economics analysts. For example, the testimony of Dr. Robert
Ellsworth'- before the FMC suggested an analogy between the provisions in
the Act to the means used to determine the fair value of commodities from
state-controlled economies under the Antidumping Act.' 2' Dr. Ellsworth
stated that under the Antidumping Act, actual comparison of prices and costs
in state-controlled economies are useless since they fail to reflect market
supply and demand.'" Thus, the FMC has contended that constructive cost
comparisons of individual rates, rather than an entire rate structure, are
highly suspect.
117. See Report of the Comptroller General of the United States, Essential Manage-
ment Functions at the Federal Maritime Commission Are Not Being Performed 34.
(January 18, 1980). In this General Accounting Office report, it was noted that im-
plementation of the Ocean Shipping Act of 1978 has caused much of the routine work of
the Office of Audits and Programs and the Bureau of Ocean Commerce Regulation to be
deferred. The report states that in November of 1978, the FMC requested sixteen posi-
tions from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for fiscal year 1979 along with
$150,000 funding. The request was denied. The impact of funding problems on im-
plementing legislation such as the Act is reflected in the report's summary of the FMC's
capabilities. As stated in the report, "minimal review of tariffs may or may not be
sufficient for (the) FMC to fulfill its regulatory duties, but apparently under normal
workloads, (the) FMC will be able to perform only a minimum review with its existing
staff." Id. Unfortunately, the Act places a great deal of emphasis on reviewing each
case on its merits and the documentary evidence, not a perfunctory task for the FMC
staff.
118. See Re Rates of Far Eastern Shipping Co., FMC Docket No. 79-10, 1-4 (March
2, 1979).
119. Id.
120. Chief of the Office of Economic Analysis, Bureau of Industry Economics, Feder-
al Maritime Commission.
121. See 19 U.S.C. § 160 et. seq. (1978). In 1979, the administration of the provi-
sions of the Antidumping Act was transferred to the Department of Commerce from the
Department of Treasury following the passage of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 19
U.S.C. § 2501.
122. See, e.g., 19 C.F.R. § 153 et. seq. (regulations for implementing the Anti-
Dumping Act).
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Dr. Ellsworth suggested a two-pronged test for implementation of the
Act. Once it has been determined that a controlled carrier is charging lower
rates and that they are unreasonable, a further requirement should be to
demonstrate some actual harm or injury to the affected carriers. Obviously,
this would represent a step backward to the old two-tiered rate analysis
under section 18(b)(5) of the Shipping Act of 1916.ln In fact, the Act assumes
that where a controlled carrier operates with rates lower than reasonable, a
prima facia case of harm is made. This area is bound to produce additional
problems as the cases brought before the FMC raise new problems with the
use of the Act. The FESCO litigation is providing the first glimpses of the
practical difficulties inherent in the Act. Indeed, the cases are by no means
complete since resort to the courts can be had after the FMC has acted on the
cases. Although this brief discussion is by no means indicative of the
complexity or content of the FESCO cases, it does point out the major
problems that are arising under the attempt of the FMC to use its new
regulatory weapon to curb the predatory practices of the Soviet shipping
community.
PROSPECTS FOR THE ACT
The Ocean Shipping Act of 1978 is in a settling process buffeted by
litigation's demands for clarity. As noted earlier, the various exceptions to
the Act appear to leave few controlled carriers subject to the Act's regulatory
scheme.'24 It is also clear that Congress was aware that the impact of the Act
would be contingent upon the FMC's ability to enforce it."= Inherent in this
awareness is the fact that Congress anticipated that fiscal or political
exigencies might dictate a degree of benign neglect in the enforcement of the
provisions of the Act.'26 Finally, the committee reports contain the interesting
note that the impact of the Act on the U.S. economy would be minimal since
controlled carriers only account for five percent or less of the total U.S.
foreign liner commerce." This conclusion is at odds with much of the
legislative concern expressed throughout the drafting of H.R. 9998. Indeed, if
123. 46 U.S.C. § 817(b)(5).
124. See 46 U.S.C. § 817(c)(6) and supra notes 95-100. The controlled carriers sub-
ject to the Act and able to avail themselves of the least number of exemptions are the
Socialist-bloc carriers.
125. See S. REP. No. 1260 at 29. In its Regulatory Impact Statement, the committee
noted that "the burden upon those carriers which remains subject to the terms of the
legislation depends upon the frequency with which the Commission may decide to in-
vestigate rates or other tariff items of a controlled carrier." Id. See also supra note 111.
126. Id.
127. See S. REP. No. 1260 at 29.
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the committees considered a five percent share of U.S. foreign liner commerce
held by a controlled carrier to be de minimus, it stands in contradiction to
much of the rationale given for enacting the Act.
STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS
Even if Congress acted hastily and the United States has indeed
overreacted to the Soviet merchant fleet's expansion, the legislation,
according to some, is nevertheless essential. As one commentator has
suggested, despite any "Red-Menace" reasoning, there is no question that
Soviet rate-cutting practices undermine the vitality of the American
merchant marine and, if unchecked, could lead the whole industry into a
depression that would be devastating."u It might be further suggested that
the passage of the Act, with the political and military considerations in-
herent therein, must be given additional weight if the economic imperatives
are less important than once thought. With the growing concern over
national defense matters, and in particular, with that of the Navy's need for
adequate logistical support, the security policies underlying the Act achieve
almost equal weight with the economic ones. In fact, similar considerations
have played an important role in regulating foreign investments in both the
U.S. Merchant Marine" and the defense industry.'30 The importance of
assessing the impact of national defense planning in legislation affecting the
U.S. Merchant Marine cannot be underestimated. 3' The Assistant Secretary
of Commerce for Maritime Affairs recently referred to the U.S. Merchant
Marine as the fourth arm of defense, an indispensable logistical tool for
projecting and sustaining U.S. military capability."' With this in mind, the
128. See Note, supra note 10. The author notes that the rate-cutting problem has
arisen at a time when U.S. flag liners are recovering from the flag-of-convenience trou-
bles. To respond to that problem, Congress enacted the Merchant Marine Act of 1970,
46 U.S.C. § 1101 (1970) to provide the framework for federal subsidies to American
shipbuilders.
129. See generally Phillips, Restraints on Foreign Investment in the Merchant
Marine-An Asset or Liability to United States Interests? 1 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 1 (1978).
130. See generally Phillips, Foreign Investment in the United States: The Defense
Industry, 56B. U. L. REV. 843 (1976).
131. See, e.g.,O'Rourke, A Good New Idea, U.S. NAVAL INST. Paoc. 47 (March 1980).
In his article, Capt. O'Rourke reasserts the propriety of Project Arapaho, a plan to use
commercial containerships as platforms to carry anti-submarine warfare (AWS) hili-
copters and modular control containers in time of a national emergency.
132. See Address by Samuel B. Nemirow, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for
Maritime Affairs, Partnership at Sea Symposium, U.S. Merchant Marine Academy (De-
cember 4, 1979). In his speech, Mr. Nemirow gave the following statistical references to
the U.S. merchant fleet: 99 percent of the tonnage carried in the import-export trade of
the United States is shipborne; over 90 percent of the military logistical support to a
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Act can be read as more than a reflexive legislative response to an economic
threat. It is that, but it is also an implicit recognition that the U.S. Merchant
Marine is an essential component of the overall political-economic-military
strength of the United States and that the most serious challenge to its
capability to fulfill its strategic role has come from the Soviet Merchant fleet
with its rate-cutting practices.
The efficacy of the Act, and its progeny that are about to follow, 3 can be
assessed in one of two ways. It could be that the Act is a legislative
overreaction propelled by some powerful lobbying from U.S. interests, 3' to
the highly visible growth of the Soviet merchant fleet. Or, as some groups
have suggested, too little is being done too late and the Act still falls short of
the checks necessary to stop the decline of the U.S. merchant fleet."3 There is
support for each contention. For example, even though the Soviet flag fleet
outnumbers that of the United States, a significant percentage of U.S.
privately-owned vessels sail under foreign flags of convenience, primarily
those of Panama and Liberia. On the other hand, if the U.S. merchant fleet is
as valued for its latent military potential in times of national emergency as
for its commercial role, U.S.-owned vessels operating under foreign flags may
be of little use, even assuming that the owners would be willing to turn them
over.'" There is, however, statutory authority for seizing these ships in time
foreign theatre of operations would have to be supplied by ship; and lastly, it was noted
that in 1979, U.S. flag tankers carried less than three percent of the nation's oil im-
ports and less than two percent of its dry-bulk trade (a trade which represents 40 per-
cent of the U.S. foreign trade tonnage). In fairness, the latter statistics ought to be read
in light of the U.S. tax laws rather than attributed solely to our maritime shipping
rates. See also Kilmarx, America's Maritime Legacy: A History of the U.S. Merchant
Marine and Shipbuilding Industry Since Colonial Times, Center for Strategic and In-
ternational Studies, Georgetown University, (1979).
133. See supra note 6.
134. See generally Ackley,supra note 10, at 27. Although Professor Ackley does not
appear to subscribe to this theory, he does attempt to present a balanced view of Soviet
maritime growth.
135. See I. HEiR, supra note 14. Among these groups are the National Maritime
Council, the International Longshoremen's Association and the Industrial Union of
Marine and Shipbuilding Workers of America (AFL-CIO) representing respectively the
trade, seafaring and longshore interests.
136. See generally McCleave, The National Defense Requirement for a U.S. Flag
Merchant Marine, NAVAL WAR C. REV. (June, 1969). Although dated in some respects,
this article presents issues that remain germane today. The availability of foreign flag
U.S. owned merchant ships has been questioned due to factors such as the location of
the ship at the time of the need, its condition, the crew's disposition and the owners'
willingness to sanction its use.
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of national emergency under § 902 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936.' 37
Statutory authority also exists for requisitioning foreign flat/foreign-owned
vessels in the event of a national emergency under the Emergency Foreign
Vessels Acquisition Act of 1954.11 It should be clear from this short exercise
in unlayering facts that the issues cannot be easily categorized as right or
wrong. A more logical approach to the Act is to view it as a significant step in
maritime legislation that will doubtlessly be modified by more Congressional
action.
CONCLUSION
The impact of the Ocean Shipping Act of 1978, a piece of legislation
aimed primarily at the Soviet Union, can be measured in the strained
relations between the maritime interests in both countries. In the general
cooling of relations that has accompanied recent global events,'39 friction
generated by the Act's passage goes unnoticed in the general media. It does,
however, exist. Recently, the Soviet Ministry of Merchant Marine attacked
leading American maritime officials and Congressional leaders for supporting
steps that could, in its words, destroy U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations. 0 Thus,
whatever the economic impact of the Act on maritime commerce, its
enactment has generated controversy over issues beyond the initial scope of
the legislation. The United States has committed itself to revamping the
Shipping Act of 1916, a primarily shipper-oriented law, to reflect the needs of
the maritime carriers. Being committed to a general goal, however, is not the
same as actually doing something about it. Congress is at a point where it
must either enact further, more potent legislation to support the merchant
137. 46 U.S.C. § 1242(a) (1970). The discretion of the President weighs heavily in
deciding whether to requisition foreign flag ships owned by U.S. citizens. The language
of the statute authorizes the requisition or purchase of "any vessel or other watercraft
owned by citizens of the United States." Id.
138. 50 U.S.C. § 196 (1970). See generally Phillips, supra note 129, at 8-14.
139. The most obvious example is the December 1979 invasion of Afghanistan by
the Soviet armed forces. the deterioration of U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf coupled
with a growing concern that the United States has become a second-rate military power
vis-a-vis the Soviet Union have also contributed to the present decline of detente.
140. See Axelbank, U.S. Blasted by Soviets, The J. of Com., March 5, 1980, at 1. The
Soviet Ministry noted that any new "protectionist" measures would generate consequ-
ences "even outside the framework of Soviet-American relations." Id. It was also noted
that if the United States intends to limit the Soviet Union to bilateral trade, Soviet
charterers may retaliate by cutting business with American shipowners operating ves-
sels under foreign flags. If anything, this threat serves to underscore the weakness of
the U.S. merchant fleet due to the large number of ships operating under foreign reg-
istry.
THE OCEAN SHIPPING ACT OF 1978
marine in the competitive world of shipping or retreat through inaction."' As
it stands, the Ocean Shipping Act of 1978 can best be viewed as a stopgap
measure in remodeling U.S. Maritime legislation to meet new challenges in
the world shipping market.' 2 These challenges did not even exist when the
original Shipping Act was enacted. Because of the antiquity of much of our
maritime legislation, as well as its lack of cohesion, new legislation is
necessary. The tortuous path of the Omnibus Maritime Bill indicates that the
concomitant effect of industry, special interest and Congressional pressures
may make a unified maritime policy a long time in coming. Whether the
threat to U.S. Shipping interests lies in the enactment of the UNCTAD Code
of Liner Conduct"13 or from the Soviet merchant fleet and its Gulliver-like
expansion, the legislative response from the United States must be coordin-
ated with and based on the political, economic and strategic imperatives of
the present. The Ocean Shipping Act of 1978 represents one step in this
direction.
Steven M. Talson
141. See The J. of Com., March 6, 1980, at 1, 33. The long awaited Omnibus Mari-
time Bill (H.R. 4769) is approaching the end of its course in the House Merchant
Marine Committee chaired by Rep. John M. Murphy. The overall goal of the legislation
is to have U.S. flag ships carry 40 percent of U.S. ocean foreign commerce. Among the
controversial provisions contained within the bill are a plan to allow U.S. operators to
build abroad and place the vessels under a U.S. subsidy program and a proposal to
centralize maritime policy decisions in a new position, a Deputy Special Representative
for Maritime Affairs to be established in the Office of the Special Representative for
Trade Negotiations in the White House. The person filling the position would have
general authority to conduct international relations pertaining to maritime affairs. If
the position is established, the effect would be to remove a number of important powers
from the FMC and the Maritime Administration.
142. See Whitehurst, Do American Shipping and Shipbuilding Have a Future?, U.S.
NAVAL INST. PROC. 66 (April 1980). Professor Whitehurst presents a concise and cogent
review of current problems in American shipping and shipbuilding. Particular atten-
tion is given the Omnibus Maritime Bill (H.R. 4769) with its inherent problems. Of
relevance to the instant discussion is Professor Whitehurst's perception of the-State
Department as lacking enthusiasm for a U.S. flag merchant marine. An indifferent or
hostile State Department would be inimical to the Omnibus Bill's treatment of control-
led carriers. That is, under the bill, the State Department would have the responsibility
for gathering data and documents from foreign governments when needed by the FMC
for a rate justification hearing. As Professor Whitehurst sees the situation, the State
Department might be a reluctant participant in this role.
143. See supra note 5. The 40-40-20 formulation of the UNCTAD document would
ensure that on a bilateral trade route each of the trading partners would be allowed to
carry forty percent of the trade on ships flying their flag, while twenty percent would
be reserved or available to Third Flag carriers. It is in this area that the United States
and the Soviet Union compete as Third Flag carriers, with the United States usually
faring poorly. A merchant marine revitalized by product legislation would be a valu-
able check on growing Soviet domination of these trade routes.
